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CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

V. FAMILY LAW
Family law provides a never-ending series of interesting questions. True to norm, the greater portion of the problems presented during the current period concerned issues arising out of
divorce suits. Many of the resulting decisions were little more
than reiterations of familiar rules; others struck at bold steps
which had been taken by the trial courts; but some brought new
horizons into view.
Illustrative of the first group is the case of Gleiser v. Gleiser1
wherein a default decree, granting plaintiff a divorce as well as
the custody of a minor child, also provided for child support and
attorney's fees although personal service on the non-resident defendant was lacking. Shortly after entry of the decree, the defendant, upon special appearance and leave granted, filed his
petition seeking to vacate those portions of the decree calling
for support money and attorney's fees because of the want of
jurisdiction over his person. The petition was denied by the
trial court after a hearing had been had thereon. That order
was reversed, as might be expected, on direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, 2 because the court noted that it had "long
been the established rule of this State that a decree requiring
the payment of alimony, child support or attorney's fees is a
decree in personam."'3 Such provisions being void for lack of
personal jurisdiction, they may properly be vacated even though
more than thirty days may have passed since the entry of the
decree,4 and the petition to vacate does not, of itself, constitute
a general appearance. 5 The court was careful to point out, however, that the father's obligation to support his child had not
ceased, either by the decree or by reason of the present ruling,
provided jurisdiction to enforce the same could be obtained.
One viewing the holdings of Illinois courts, when dealing with
the effect which remarriage has upon lump-sum alimony provi1402

Ill. 343, 83 N. E. (2d) 693 (1949).
Direct appeal was proper, under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 199, because the alleged denial of due process presented a constitutional issue.
3 402 Ill. 343 at 345, 83 N. E. (2d) 693 at 694.
4 Thayer v. Village of Downers Grove, 369 Ill. 354, 16 N. E. (2d) 717 (1938).
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 144.
2
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sions payable in installments,' would think that the "trap" created thereby could be successfully avoided.7 The lump-sum alimony settlement incorporated in the divorce decree entered in
Hotzfield v. Hotzfield s required the husband to irrevocably name
his wife and his minor child as beneficiaries under all life insurance then in force. Another clause of the settlement provided
that, upon complete payment of the installments of alimony, the
minor child should be named the sole beneficiary. The policies
were to be held temporarily by the wife as security. Upon her
remarriage prior to full payment of the lump-sum provision, the
divorced husband petitioned for relief from any further obligation under the decree so far as it concerned the ex-wife and also
sought the return of an insurance policy held by her. Denial of
such petition was reversed on appeal on the basis that the holding in Adler v. Adler" required it, but there is occasion to believe that a different result would presently be obtained because
of an amendment, noted hereafter, which has been made to the
Divorce Act.
The tribulations of the "battling" Borins are reasonably
well-known to Chicago lawyers. Another chapter in their saga
has been written by the holding in Borin v. Borin, 10 a suit for
divorce on the ground of desertion filed by Mrs. Borin on the
day following the final disposition of a prior suit in which both
parties had sought divorce but where relief had been denied to
either. The present complaint originally charged the husband
with adultery during the period which elapsed between the taking of a jury verdict and the rendition of the decree in the for6 Adler v. Adler, 373 Ill. 361, 26 N. E. (2d) 504 (1940); Banck v. Banck, 322
Ill. App. 369, 54 N. E. (2d) 577 (1944), leave to appeal denied, discussed in 22
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 276. The prevailing rule, prior to the 1933 amendment to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 18, likewise seems to have been that
the remarriage of the alimony recipient was such a change of condition as to
warrant the termination of alimony payments: Maginnis v. Maginnis, 323 Ill. 113,
153 N. E. 654 (1926) ; Stillman v. Stillman, 99 Ill. 196, 39 Am. St. Rep. 21 (1881).
7 See, for example, Reighley v. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 390 Ill.
242, 61 N. E. (2d) 29 (1945) ; Kohl v. Kohl, 330 Ill. App. 284, 71 N. E. (2d) 358
(1947) ; Drangle v. Lindauer, 323 Ill. App. 23, 54 N. E. (2d) 75 (1944), leave to
appeal denied.
8336 Ill. App. 238, 83 N. E. (2d) 605 (1948), noted in 44 Ill. L. Rev. 382 and
37 Ill. B. J. 492.
9373 Ill. 361, 26 N. E. (2d) 504 (1940).
10335 Ill. App. 450, 82 N. E. (2d) 70 (1949), noted in 33 Marquette L. Rev. 62.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

mer case. An amended complaint was filed soon thereafter substituting desertion as the ground relied upon. The desertion was
alleged to have been continuous since the time when the parties
first became embroiled in litigation. Plaintiff, although successful in her pursuit for a decree, later moved the trial court to
vacate the decree and to dismiss the amended complaint without
prejudice on the ground that she had been induced to switch
the charge from adultery to desertion because representations
had been made that she would be given exclusive custody of her
child with an adequate provision for the infant's support, representations she regarded as unfulfilled by the decree. On plaintiff's appeal from the denial of her motion, the Appellate Court
reversed and ordered the complaint dismissed for want of equity,
finding the situation to be one identical with that posed in Floberg
v. Floberg," which made it the duty of the court, on its own
motion, to examine the question and to determine whether plain12
tiff had been deserted by the defendant for the requisite period.
The case serves to emphasize the rule of this state that the running of the period of desertion is tolled while a bona-fide action
is pending between the parties, whether for divorce or separate
maintenance, during which period the parties are not only justifiably living apart but must so live to give any substance to
the pending complaint. Nothing short of a new desertion with a
further completed period of separation would seem to suffice.
Illustrative of the second group of cases is Clubb v. Clubb'3
wherein an attempt was made to enforce, through contempt proceedings, a local decree for alimony which had been entered in
aid of a prior divorce decree rendered by an English court. Defendant sought to purge himself of contempt by asserting that
11 358 Ill. 626, 193 N. E. 456 (1934).
12 The court stated its duty in terms of language to be found in Oilman v. Oilman,
396 I1. 176 at 182, 71 N. E. (2d) 50 at 53 (1947), to the effect that: "In all divorce
suits the public occupies the position of a third party. It does not plead, but is
represented by the conscience of the court; and so, whenever a defense comes out
This is
in the evidence, whether alleged, or not, it is fatal to the proceeding. . ..
true, not because the defendant has any just right to take advantage of a defense
which he has not pleaded, but because the public interest is involved, and the
conscience of the court, appealed to by this interest, does not permit the divorce
unless the facts represented on the whole record justify it."
13 402 Il1. 390, 84 N. E. (2d) 366 (1949), noted in 37 Ill. B. J. 310, reversing 334
Ill. App. 599, 80 N. E. (2d) 94 (1948), noted in 27 CHICAGo-KENT LAW Rvigw 65.
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his failure to pay was occasioned solely by lack of funds. The
trial court so found and dismissed the contempt citation. The
Appellate Court for the First District reversed and remanded
with directions to find defendant guilty. On further appeal, the
Illinois Supreme Court heard argument on behalf of the defendant to the effect that equity lacked jurisdiction to compel
payment of the past due alimony because (1) there was an adequate remedy at law; (2) that the power over contemptuous conduct did not extend to the enforcement of a money judgment
for past due alimony; (3) that the contempt process was not
proper under any rule of comity; and (4) the requirements of
full faith and credit were inapplicable to the decree of a foreign
country. In opposition, appellee argued that the decree which
had been entered below was one for alimony, properly enforcible
14
by contempt proceedings under Section 42 of the Chancery Act,
and was one which was called for by principles of comity. The
high court, reversing the action taken by the Appellate Court,
held that the full faith and credit doctrine was inapplicable;15
that it was doubtful that the legislature, when enacting the statute relied upon, had in mind the enforcement of foreign decrees
particularly since, without statute or treaty, the comity of the
United States did not demand conclusive recognition of judgments emanating from foreign countries; and that, absent a statute giving specific authority, equity courts sitting in Illinois could
not draw on any inherent equitable power for jurisdiction in di6
vorce matters is solely the creature of statute.1
While the decision is probably correct in the light of existing provisions, it leaves the problem of dealing with the migrating alimony obligor in an unsatisfactory state. Part of the disIR. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 22, § 42.
15 Referring to Boissevan v. Boissevan, 252 N. Y. 178, 169 N. E. 130 (1929), the
Illinois court said: "This decision seems to be authority for recognition of the
foreign judgment to the extent that a judgment for arrears in payment of alimony
based thereon may be procured in a State court but that, in the absence of a
particular statute for that purpose, the foreign judgment cannot be enforced as
one for the payment of alimony rendered by courts of a State." See 402 Ill.
390 at 395, 84 N. E. (2d) 366 at 369.
16 That a court of equity hearing divorce matters is exercising only a statutory
and not an inherent jurisdiction is amply borne out by such cases as Arndt v.
Arndt, 399 Ill. 490, 78 N. E. (2d) 272 (1948) ; Smith v. Smith, 334 Ill. 370, 166 N.
E. 85 (1929) ; and Smith v. Johnson, 321 Ill. 134, 151 N. E. 550 (1926).
14
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satisfaction with the decision may lie in the fact that the plaintiff, in her complaint, sought only a judgment for the arrears
in alimony payments and did not seek to have the English decree established here as a local equitable decree. 7 Such had
been done in Rule v. Rule,' s the first Illinois case to grant equitable relief against a wandering defendant under an obligation
to pay alimony imposed by the decree of a sister state. There
may or may not be significance in the fact that the court rendering the decision in the instant case seemingly cast no reflection upon the holding therein.
If the decision of the Appellate Court for the Second District in Parker v. Parker19 is to stand, however, the spouse who
migrates before jurisdiction can attach is apt to find that he
does not leave all his troubles behind when he abandons his family. In that case, a mother, suing in her own behalf but also
and primarily claiming as the next friend for her minor daughter, filed a complaint in equity seeking to require the fatherdefendant to contribute to the support of his child. It appeared
therein that an Indiana divorce had been granted the mother,
together with custody of the child, but the decree was properly
silent as to alimony or support for the husband was beyond the
jurisdiction for purpose of personal service. The defendant's
motion to strike the complaint had been sustained purely on
the question of law involved, the argument proceeding on the
ground that the only statutory authority for equitable action
in matters of this character was in conjunction with the local
granting of a divorce. 20 The plaintiff, on appeal, successfully
stressed the constitutional mandate calling for a remedy for
every wrong 2' as well as the plenary jurisdiction which equity
17 The Illinois Supreme Court, 402 Ill. 390 at 396, 84 N. E. (2d) 366 at 369,
stressed the fact that in almost all the cases cited by plaintiff, in which a judgment or decree of a sister state had been enforced, the local court "had first
established the judgment as its judgment or decree."
18313 Ill. App. 108, 39 N. E. (2d) 379 (1942), noted in 21 CHIOAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 46-7.
19335 Ill. App. 293, 81 N. E. (2d) 745 (1948), noted in 37 Ill. B. J. 317 and 1949
U. of Ill. Law Forum 151. Leave to appeal has been denied.
20 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 19.
21 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 19.
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has long exercised over the interests and estates of minors. The
court, accepting the validity of the Indiana divorce decree and
the custody order contained therein, 22 reasoned that the divorce
had no effect upon the moral or legal obligations of the defendant to support his minor offspring.2 3 It said that acceptance
of the defendant's argument would be tantamount to sanctioning the "abrogation of the legal obligation of parenthood," for
a father would need have only to leave the jurisdiction so personal service could not be had and, no support order being entered against him, there would be nothing to support supplemental proceedings in any other jurisdiction where he might be
found. The Appellate Court for the First District, in Hawkins
v. Hawkins,24 had reached the opposite conclusion on a similar
case because of the absence of specific statutory authority to
support any action. The dispute existing between the districts
now makes the problem one for high court consideration if the
legislature is unwilling to take action. There is adequate basis
25
elsewhere on which to ground a. solution.
The impact which a subsequent Nevada absolute divorce decree may have on a prior separate maintenance decree handed
down in Illinois became the matter of issue in Buck v. Buck, 2 6 a
case which brings new light into a much confused area of the
law. The plaintiff therein, in 1943, had been granted a decree of
separate maintenance by an Illinois court. The husband then
moved to Nevada and, meeting residential requirements, filed a
complaint for divorce there. The wife, being fully informed of
the pending action, appeared in the Nevada case and filed an
answer and cross-bill. The Nevada court granted the wife a
divorce and approved a property settlement under which she
22
23

290
24
25

593,
176,
809
26

Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § 116.
Kelley v. Kelley, 317 Ill. 104, 147 N. E. 659 (1925) ; Plaster v. Plaster, 47 Ill.
(1868) ; Hoover v. Hoover, 307 I1. App. 590, 30 N. E. (2d) 940 (1940).
288 Ill. App. 623, 6 N. E. (2d) 509 (1937), abst. opin.
Davies v. Fisher, 34 Cal. App. 137, 166 P. 833 (1917) ; Riggs v. Riggs, 91 Kan.
138 P. 628, Ann. Cas. 1915D 809 (1914); Winner v. Schucart, 202 Mo. App.
215 S. W. 905 (1919) ; Geary v. Geary, 102 Neb. 511, 167 N. W. 778, 20 A. L. R.
(1918).
338 Ill. App. 179, 86 N. E. (2d) 415 (1949), noted in 27 CHICAGO-KENT LAW

REVIEW 318.
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accepted certain monetary benefits. The ex-wife later petitioned
the Illinois court for an increase in the support money granted
by the Illinois decree. Her request was met by the action of the
defendant, again a resident of Illinois, in calling the court's attention to the Nevada decree as well as to the petitioner's active
participation in the Nevada proceeding. Despite petitioner's
claim of lack of jurisdiction in, and imposition on, the Nevada
court, the lower Illinois court ruled that the Nevada decree,
being valid, operated to negative the prior Illinois order. The
Appellate Court, finding that the Nevada decree met the requirements for full faith and credit as recently announced by the
United States Supreme Court, 27 blocked any collateral attack
thereon, principally because of the petitioner's voluntary appear28
ance and submission to the jurisdiction of that state.
The plaintiff in Lagow v. Snapp,29 claiming as widow of her
intestate deceased husband, had been awarded both the homestead and an undivided share of the realty under a partition decree. The appealing defendant, relying on a post-nuptial contract made between the plaintiff and her husband, asserted the
widow had parted with all interest in her husband's property. The
plaintiff's reply had been, inter alia, that the contract was contrary to public policy because it had operated to relieve the
husband of his duty to support, 0 with which reply the chancellor
had agreed. The Supreme Court, when affirming the decree, admitted that a wife might "by a written contract with her husband, based upon a valuable consideration, release to him her
rights in his property and estate and thereby extinguish her right
27 Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343, 68 S. Ct. 1087, 92 L. Ed. 1429, 1 A. L. R.
(2d) 1355 (1948); Coe v. Coe, 334 U. S. 378, 68 S. Ct. 1094, 92 L. Ed. 1451, 1
A. L. R. (2d) 1376 (1948).
28 Those specially interested in the problem might wish to compare the decision
with the holding in Lynn v. Lynn, 275 App. Div. 269, 88 N. Y. S. (2d) 791 (1949),
where a New York court of equivalent rank reached an opposite result.
29400 Ill. 414, 81 N. E. (2d) 144 (1948), noted in 37 Ill. B. J. 272.
30 The agreement, entered into at a time when the plaintiff and her husband
were contemplating separation, contained the following pertinent sentence: "And
the said Harriet Lagow further releases and relinquishes forever all her rights,
interest or claims which she may now have against the said Earle Lagow, or any
interest she may hereafter acquire against him or may have present or prospective
in his estates, real or personal, either as heir, widow or otherwise." See 400 Ill.
414 at 417, 81 N. E. (2d) 144 at 146.
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as widow, including the right of dower,"'1 but pointed out that
it had consistently declared that contracts "wherein the wife
attempted to discharge her husband from his legal obligation
to maintain her . . . are against public policy and are therefore void."' 32 Defendant's counsel did not challenge the latter
principle but did argue that the agreement before the court was
simply a property settlement. The court rejected this contention because the contract, taken as a whole, was said to reveal
an intention not only to settle property rights but also to provide the husband with a release from the obligation of maintenance and support. If the overly-ambitious draftsman had used
more restraint when phrasing the agreement, he might have produced an entirely different result.
The case of Arndt v. Arndt3 3 having again come before an
appellate tribunal, 34 the way was opened for consideration of the
rare problem of a plaintiff's right to have annulment of a marriage entered into because of the alleged fraudulent representation by defendant that the plaintiff was the father of her unborn child where the plaintiff admitted sexual contact with defendant prior to the marriage but where there was no cohabitation following the ceremony. Only two other cases from Illinois, those of Helfrick v. Helfrick3 and Short v. Short,3 6 would
seem to deal with the point.3 7 In the first, the court held the
31 400 Ill. 414 at 419, 81 N. E. (2d) 144 at 147. Among the cases so declaring
are Weinebrod v. Rohdenburg, 343 Ill. 318, 175 N. E. 379 (1931) ; Kirchner v.
Morrison, 320 Ill. 236, 150 N. E. 690 (1926) ; Edwards v. Edwards, 267 Ill. 111, 107
N. E. 847, Ann. Cas. 1917A 64 (1915) ; Stokes v. Stokes, 240 Il. 330, 88 N. E. 829
(1909).
32 Prior expressions of this view may be seen in Vock v. Vock, 365 Il.
432, 6
N. E. (2d) 843 (1937) ; Van Koten v. Van Koten, 323 II. 323, 154 N. E. 146, 50
A. L. R. 437 (1926) ; Lyons v. Shanbacher, 316 Ill. 569, 147 N. E. 440 (1925).
33 336 Il. App. 65, 82 N. E. (2d) 908 (1948).
Feinberg, P. J., wrote a dissenting
opinion.
34 See 399 Ill. 490, 78 N. E. (2d) 272 (1948), reversing 331 Ill. App. 85, 72 N. E.
(2d) 718 (1947), noted in 27 CHicAGo-KENT LAW RmIEw 68-9. The issue there
had been whether the putative husband was obliged to pay attorney's fees to the
alleged wife in support of her defense to an annulment action.
35 246 Ill. App. 294 (1927).
36265 Ill. App. 133 (1932).
37 Two other Illinois cases contain the same general issue although the fraudulent
representations pertained to other matters. In Lyon v. Lyon, 230 Ill. 366, 82 N. E.
850, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 996, 12 Ann. Cas. 25 (1907), a case refusing to follow
the rule of DiLorenzo v. DiLorenzo, 174 N. Y. 467, 67 N. E. 63, 95 Am. St. Rep. 609
(1903), annulment based on an allegation of untrue representations as to health
was denied, the court saying the representation charged was "similar in kind to
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false representation no ground for annulment. In the second,
without mention of the prior decision, the same court ruled that
the defendant's cross-bill to a suit by the "wife" for separate
maintenance should have been sustained.
Measuring the facts and circumstances of the instant case
with what it conceived to be the trend of opinion, the majority
decided that, with the exception of Foss v. Foss5 and other
Massachusetts cases, 39 there was no controlling decision which
declared that the plaintiff had to go without a remedy.40 A wellreasoned dissent, 41 however, took the position that plaintiff, having admitted intercourse with the defendant within the possible
period of gestation, should, as a matter of public policy, be barred
from undertaking to bastardize the child, 42 particularly since
the plaintiff appeared to have accepted defendant's assertions
without any investigation whatsoever, thereby demonstrating the
lack of an essential allegation to a complaint predicated on
fraud.43 There is, therefore, room to speculate whether the decision should stand.
that of a pregnant woman, who induces a man with whom she has had illicit
intercourse to marry her by the false representation that he is the father of her
child. But such representation, under such circumstances, does not constitute
fraud for which the marriage will be annulled." See also Hull v. Hull, 191 Ill.
App. 307 (1915), where the fraudulent representation was said to be that the
defendant-husband had not engaged in sexual relations prior to marrying plaintiff, but annulment was denied.
3894 Mass. (12 Allen) 26 (1866).
39Arno v. Arno, 265 Mass. 282, 163 N. E. 861 (1928); Crehore v. Crehore, 97
Mass. 330, 93 Am. Dec. 98 (1867).
40 Consider, for example, Lyman v. Lyman, 90 Conn. 399, 97 A. 312, L. R. A.
1916E 643 (1916) ; Jackson v. Ruby, 120 Me. 391, 115 A. 90 (1921) ; Gard v. Gard,
204 Mich. 255, 169 N. W. 908, 11 A. L. R. 923 (1918) ; Winner v. Winner, 171 Wis.
413, 177 N. W. 680, 11 A. L. R. 919 (1920).
41 The dissenting opinion calls attention to the anomalous character of the decision
in Short v. Short, 265 Ill. App. 133 (1932), by pointing out that the opinion therein,
granting annulment, was handed down by the same judge who had written the
opinion in the earlier case of Helfrick v. Helfrick, 246 Ill. App. 294 (1927), which
had denied annulment.
In Orthwein
42 People ex rel. Cullison v. Dile, 347 Ill. 23, 179 N, E. 93 (1931).
v. Thomas, 127 Ill. 554 at 562, 21 N. E. 430 at 431 (1889), the Illinois Supreme
Court had noted that the "law presumes that every child in a Christian country
is prima facie the off-spring of a lawful, rather than a meretricious union of
the parents. [It] is unwilling to bastardize children. . . . The presumption of
the law is not lightly to be repelled; it is not to be lightly broken in upon or shaken
by a mere balance of probabilities."
43 Bishop, Marriage and Divorce, Vol. 1, § 167, states:
"A man who means to
act upon such representations should verify them by his own inquiry. The law
presumes that he uses due caution in a matter in which his happiness for life is
so materially involved and it makes no provision for relief of a blind credulity,
however it may have been produced."
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The legislature adopted three important statutory amendments during the period of this survey. The first empowers the
Supreme Court to adopt rules providing for a sixty day "cooling
off" period in divorce cases so as to provide an opportunity to
effect a reconciliation. 4 4 The second, enacted to overcome constitutional objections which had rendered sterile prior attempts
45 now provides for stateto create a special divorce division,
wide operation of such tribunals. 46 The third, intended to obviate the construction previously placed on Section 18 of the
Divorce Act as it related to the payment of alimony after remarriage, 47 directs that lump-sum alimony provisions, although
payable in installments, shall continue in effect until discharged
in full even though the ex-spouse entitled thereto should remarry or either party to the decree should die. 48 Another bill
concerning family relations, one designed to compel support
of dependent wives, children and poor relatives, both within and
without the state, 49 has already been exposed to criticism over
its possible unconstitutionality."

VI.

PROPERTY

REAL AND PERSONAL PROPRTY

Owners of land can no longer expect to thwart prospective
adverse claimants simply by keeping them off the surface of the
land. They must cock a watchful eye toward the air above, according to the holding in Poulos v. P. H. Hill Company, Inc.,' wherein
the land owner was denied the right to erect a building on some
two and one-half feet of his property because an adjoining owner
had acquired the right, by prescription, to maintain a fire escape
over the premises through its long continued presence in the air
Laws 1949, p. 1189, H. B. 1010; I1. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 126.
45 Hunt v. Cook County, 398 Ill. 412, 76 N. E. (2d) 48 (1947).
46 Laws 1949, p. 730, S. B. 307; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 105.19 et seq.
47 See cases cited in note 6, ante.
48 Laws 1949, p. 729, S. B. 175; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 19.
49 Laws 1949, p. 1191, H. B. 869; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 68, § 50 et seq.
50 See Fins, "Legislation Affecting Practice," 38 Ill. B. J. 71, particularly p. 91
1401 Ill. 204, 81 N. E. (2d) 854 (1948).
44

